Abstract Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games-that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games-are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics to speed up the computations.
that are correct-by-construction. Of particular interest are quantitative games, that allow one to model precisely quantitative parameters of the system, such as energy consumption. In this setting, the game is played by two players on a directed weighted graph, where the edge weights model, for instance, a cost or a reward associated with the moves of the players. Each vertex of the graph belongs to one of the two players who compete by moving a token along the graph edges, thereby forming an infinite path called a play. With each play is associated a real-valued payoff computed from the sequence of edge weights along the play. The traditional payoffs that have been considered in the literature include total-payoff [12] , mean-payoff [9] and discounted-payoff [21] . In this quantitative setting, one player aims at maximising the payoff while the other tries to minimise it. So one wants to compute, for each player, the best payoff that he can guarantee from each vertex, and the associated optimal strategies (i.e. that guarantee the optimal payoff no matter how the adversary is playing).
Such quantitative games have been extensively studied in the literature. Their associated decision problems (is the value of a given vertex above a given threshold?) are known to be in NP ∩ co-NP . Mean-payoff games have arguably been best studied from the algorithmic point of view. A landmark is Zwick and Paterson's [21] pseudo-polynomial time (i.e. polynomial in the weighted graph when weights are encoded in unary) algorithm, using the value iteration paradigm that consists in computing a sequence of vectors of values that converges towards the optimal values of the vertices. After a fixed, pseudo-polynomial, number of steps, the computed values are precise enough to deduce the actual values of all vertices. Better pseudopolynomial time algorithms have later been proposed, e.g., by Björklund and Vorobyov [1] , Brim et al. [6] , Comin and Rizzi [8] , also achieving sub-exponential expected running time by means of randomisation.
In this paper, we focus on total-payoff games. 1 Given an infinite play π, we denote by π[k] the prefix of π of length k, and by TP(π[k]) the (finite) sum of all edge weights along this prefix. The total-payoff of π, TP(π), is the inferior limit of all those sums, i.e.
TP(π) = lim inf k→∞ TP(π[k]).
Compared to mean-payoff (and discounted-payoff) games, the literature on total-payoff games is less extensive. Gimbert and Zielonka [12] have shown that optimal memoryless strategies always exist for both players and the best algorithm to compute the values runs in exponential time [11] , and consists in iteratively improving strategies. Other related works include energy games where one player tries to optimise its energy consumption (computed again as a sum), keeping the energy level always above 0. Note that it differs in essence from total-payoff games where no condition on the energy level is required: in particular, the optimal total-payoff could be negative, and even −∞, and it is a priori not possible to simply lift all the weights by a constant to solve total-payoff games by solving a related energy games. Moreover, this difference makes difficult to apply techniques solving energy games in the case of total-payoff games. Probabilistic variants of total-payoff games have also been studied, but the weights are restricted to be non-negative [7] .
We argue that the total-payoff objective is interesting as a refinement of the mean-payoff. Indeed, recall first that the total-payoff is finite if and only if the mean-payoff is null. Then, the computation of the total-payoff enables a finer, two-stage analysis of a game G: (i) compute the mean payoff MP(G); (ii) subtract MP(G) from all edge weights, and scale the resulting weights if necessary to obtain integers. At that point, one has obtained a new game G with null mean-payoff; (iii) compute TP(G ) to quantify the amount of fluctuation around the mean-payoff of the original game. Unfortunately, so far, no efficient (i.e. pseudopolynomial time) algorithms for total-payoff games have been proposed, and straightforward adaptations of Zwick and Paterson's value iteration algorithm for mean-payoff do not work, as we demonstrate at the end of Sect. 2. In the present article, we fill in this gap by introducing the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for computing the values in total-payoff games.
Our solution is a non-trivial value iteration algorithm that proceeds through nested fixed points (see Algorithm 2) . A play of a total-payoff game is infinite by essence. We transformIn the following, such refined total-payoff games-where Min must reach a designated target vertex-will be called min-cost reachability games (MCR games). Failing to reach the target vertices is the worst situation for Min, so the payoff of all plays that do not reach the target is +∞, irrespective of the weights along the play. Otherwise, the payoff of a play is the sum of the weights up to the first occurrence of the target. As such, this problem nicely generalises the classical shortest path problem in a weighted graph. In the one-player setting (considering the point of view of Min for instance), this problem can be solved in polynomial time by Dijkstra's and Floyd-Warshall's algorithms when the weights are non-negative and arbitrary, respectively. Khachiyan et al. [13] propose an extension of Dijkstra's algorithm to handle the two-player, non-negative weights case. However, in our more general setting (two players, arbitrary weights), this problem has, as far as we know, not been studied as such, except that the associated decision problem is known to be in NP ∩ co-NP [10] . A pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to solve a very close problem, called the longest shortest path problem (LSP) has been introduced by Björklund and Vorobyov [1] to eventually solve mean-payoff games. However, because of this peculiar context of mean-payoff games, their definition of the length of a path differs from our definition of the payoff and their algorithm can not be easily adapted to solve our MCR problem. Thus, as a second contribution, we show that a value iteration algorithm enables us to compute in pseudo-polynomial time the values of a MCR game. We believe that MCR games bear their own potential theoretical and practical applications. 2 Those games are discussed in Sect. 3 . In addition to the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the values, we show how to compute optimal strategies for both players and characterise them: there is always a memoryless strategy for the maximiser player, but we exhibit an example (see Fig. 2 ) where the minimiser player needs (finite) memory. Those results on MCR games are exploited in Sect. 4 where we introduce and prove correct our efficient algorithm for total-payoff games.
Finally, we briefly present our implementation in Sect. 5, using as a core the numerical model-checker PRISM. This allows us to describe some heuristics able to improve the practical performances of our algorithms for total-payoff games and MCR games on certain subclasses of graphs.
Quantitative games with arbitrary weights
In this section, we formally introduce the game model we consider throughout the article.
We denote by Z the set of integers, and Z ∞ = Z ∪ {−∞, +∞}. The set of vectors indexed by V with values in S is denoted by S V . We let be the pointwise order over Z V ∞ , where x y if and only if x(v) y(v) for all v ∈ V .
Games played on graphs
We consider two-player turn-based games played on weighted graphs and denote the two players by Max and Min. A weighted graph is a tuple V, E, ω where V = V Max V Min is a finite set of vertices partitioned into the sets V Max and V Min of Max and Min respectively, E ⊆ V × V is a set of directed edges, ω : E → Z is the weight function, associating an integer weight with each edge. In our drawings, Max vertices are depicted by circles; Min vertices by rectangles. For every vertex v ∈ V , the set of successors of v with respect to E is denoted by E(v) = {v ∈ V | (v, v ) ∈ E}. Without loss of generality, we assume that every graph is deadlock-free, i.e. for all vertices v, E(v) = ∅. Finally, throughout this article, we let W = max (v,v ) ∈E |ω(v, v )| be the greatest edge weight (in absolute value) in the game graph. A finite play is a finite sequence of vertices π = v 0 v 1 . . . v k ∈ V * such that for all 0 i < k, (v i , v i+1 ) ∈ E. A play is an infinite sequence of vertices π = v 0 v 1 . . . such that every finite prefix v 0 . . . v k , denoted by π [k] , is a finite play.
The total-payoff of a finite play π = v 0 v 1 . . . v k is obtained by summing up the weights along π, i.e. TP(π) = k−1 i=0 ω(v i , v i+1 ). In the following, we sometimes rely on the meanpayoff to obtain information about total-payoff objectives. The mean-payoff computes the average weight of π, i.e. if k 1, MP(π) =
, and MP(π) = 0 when k = 0. These definitions are lifted to infinite plays as follows. The total-payoff of a play π is given by TP(π) = lim inf k→∞ TP(π[k]). 3 Similarly, the mean-payoff of a play π is given by MP(π) = lim inf k→∞ MP(π[k]). Tuples V, E, ω, TP and V, E, ω, MP , where V, E, ω is a weighted graph, are called total-payoff and mean-payoff games respectively.
Strategies and values
A strategy for Max (respectively, Min) in a game G = V, E, ω, P (with P one of the previous payoffs), is a mapping σ :
. A strategy σ is memoryless if for all finite plays π, π , we have that σ (πv) = σ (π v) for all v ∈ V . A strategy σ is said to be finite-memory if it can be encoded in a deterministic Moore machine, M, m 0 , up, dec , where M is a finite set representing the memory of the strategy, with an initial memory content m 0 ∈ M, up : M × V → M is a memory-update function, and dec : M × V → V a decision function such that for every finite play π and vertex v, σ (πv) = dec(mem(πv), v) where mem(π) is defined by induction on the length of the finite play π as follows: mem(v 0 ) = m 0 , and mem(πv) = up(mem(π), v). In this case, we say that |M| is the size of the strategy.
For all strategies σ Max and σ Min , for all vertices v, we let Play(v, σ Max , σ Min ) be the outcome of σ Max and σ Min , defined as the unique play conforming to σ Max and σ Min and starting in v. Naturally, the objective of Max is to maximise its payoff. In this model of zero-sum game, Min then wants to minimise the payoff of Max. Formally, we let Val G (v, σ Max ) and Val G (v, σ Min ) be the respective values of the strategies, defined as (recall that P is either TP or MP): 
, and refer to it as the value of v in G. If the game is clear from the context, we may drop the index G from all previous notations. Mean-payoff and total-payoff games are known to be determined, with the existence of optimal memoryless strategies [12, 21] .
Previous works and contribution
Total-payoff games have been mainly considered as a refinement of mean-payoff games [12] . Indeed, if the mean-payoff value of a game is positive (respectively, negative), its total-payoff value is necessarily +∞ (−∞). When the mean-payoff value is 0 however, the total-payoff is necessarily different from +∞ and −∞, hence total-payoff games are particularly useful in this case, to refine the analysis of the game. Deciding whether the total-payoff value of a vertex is positive can be achieved in NP ∩ co-NP . Gawlitza and Seidl [11] refined the complexity to UP ∩ co-UP, and values are shown to be effectively computable solving nested fixed point equations with a strategy iteration algorithm working in exponential time in the worst case. Because of this strong relationship between mean-and total-payoff games, we can show that total-payoff games are, in some sense, as hard as mean-payoff games, for which the existence of a (strongly) polynomial time algorithm is a long-standing open question.
In this article, we improve on this state-of-the-art and introduce the first (to the best of our knowledge) pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games. In many cases, (e.g., mean-payoff games), a successful way to obtain such an efficient algorithm is the value iteration paradigm. Intuitively, value iteration algorithms compute successive approximations x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x i , . . . of the game value by restricting the number of turns that the players are allowed to play: x i is the vector of optimal values achievable when the players play at most i turns. The sequence of values is computed by means of an operator F , letting x i+1 = F (x i ) for all i. Good properties (Scott-continuity and monotonicity) of F ensure convergence towards its smallest or greatest fixed point (depending on the value of x 0 ), which, in some cases, is the value of the game.
Let us briefly explain why, unfortunately, a straightforward application of this approach fails with total-payoff games. In our case, the most natural operator F is such that
Indeed, this definition matches the intuition that x N is the optimal value after N turns. Then, consider the example of Fig. 1a , limited to vertices {v 3 , v 4 , v 5 } for simplicity. Observe that there are two simple cycles with weight 0, hence the total-payoff value of this game is finite. Max has the choice between cycling into one of these two cycles. It is easy to check that Max's optimal choice is to enforce the cycle between v 4 and v 5 , securing a payoff of −1 from v 4 (because of the lim inf definition of TP). Hence, the values of v 3 , v 4 and v 5 are respectively 1, −1 and 0. In this game, we have
, and the vector (1, −1, 0) is indeed a fixed point of F . However, it is neither the greatest nor the smallest fixed point of F . Indeed, it is easy to check that, if x is a fixed point of F , then x + (a, a, a) is also a fixed point, for all constant a ∈ Z ∪ {−∞, +∞}. If we try to initialise the value iteration algorithm with value (0, 0, 0), which could seem a reasonable choice, the sequence of computed vectors is:
. that is not stationary, and does not even contain (1, −1, 0). Notice that (−∞, −∞, −∞) and (+∞, +∞, +∞) are fixed points, so that they do not allow us to find the correct answer too. Thus, it seems difficult to compute the actual game values with an iterative algorithm relying on the operator F , as in the case of mean-payoff games. 4 Notice that, in the previous example, the Zwick and Paterson's algorithm [21] Instead, as explained in the introduction, we propose a different approach that consists in reducing total-payoff games to MCR games where Min must enforce a reachability objective on top of his optimisation objective. The aim of the next section is to study these games, and we reduce total-payoff games to them in Sect. 4.
Min-cost reachability games
In this section, we consider MCR games, a variant of total-payoff games where one player has a reachability objective that he must fulfil first, before minimising his quantitative objective (hence the name min-cost reachability). Without loss of generality, we assign the reachability objective to player Min, as this will make our reduction from total-payoff games easier to explain. Hence, when the target is not reached along a path, the payoff of this path shall be the worst possible for Min, i.e. +∞. Formally, an MCR game is played on a weighted graph V, E, ω equipped with a target set of vertices T ⊆ V . The payoff T -MCR(π) of a play Proof Consider a quantitative game G = V, E, ω, P and a vertex v ∈ V . We will prove the determinacy result by using the Borel determinacy result of [15] . First, notice that the payoff mapping T -MCR is Borel measurable since the set of plays with finite T -MCR payoff is a countable union of cylinders. Then, for an integer M, consider Win M to be the set of plays with a payoff less than or equal to M. It is a Borel set, so that the qualitative game defined over the graph V, E, ω with winning condition Win M is determined. We now use this preliminary result to show our determinacy result.
We fix an MCR game and one of its vertices v, and first consider cases where either the lower or the upper values is infinite. Suppose first that Val(v) = −∞. We have to show that A remark on related work Let us note that [1] introduce the LSP and propose a pseudopolynomial time algorithm to solve it. However, their definition has several subtle but important differences to ours, such as in the definition of the payoff of a play (equivalently, the length of a path). As an example, in the game of Fig. 2 , the play π = (v 1 v 2 ) ω (that never reaches the target) has length −∞ in their setting, while, in our setting, {v 3 }-MCR(π) = +∞. A more detailed comparison of the two definitions is given in "Appendix". Moreover, even if a preprocessing would hypothetically allow one to use the LSP algorithm to solve MCR games, our solution (that has the same worst-case complexity as theirs) is simpler to implement, and we also introduce (see Sect. 5) heuristics that are only applicable to our value iteration solution.
As explained in the introduction of this section, we show how to solve those games, i.e. how to compute Val(v) for all vertices v in pseudo-polynomial time. This procedure will be instrumental to solving total-payoff games. Our contributions are summarised in the following theorem: 
Finding vertices with value +∞
To prove the first item of Theorem 3, it suffices to notice that vertices with value +∞ are exactly those from which Min can not reach the target. Therefore the problem reduces to deciding the winner in a classical reachability game, that can be solved in polynomial time [19] , using the classical attractor construction. More precisely, let G = V, E, ω, T -MCR be an MCR game. Notice that for all plays π = v 0 v 1 . . ., T -MCR(π) = +∞ if and only if v k / ∈ T for all k 0, i.e. π avoids the target.
Then, let us show that the classical attractor technique [19] allows us to compute the set 
It is well-known that this sequence converges after at most |V | steps to the set Attr(T ) of all vertices from which Min has a memoryless strategy to ensure reaching T . Hence, under our hypothesis, V +∞ = V \Attr(T ). This proves the first item of Theorem 3. Observe that we can safely remove from the game graph all vertices v such that Val(v) = +∞, without changing the values of the other vertices. Hence, we can, when need be, assume that the MCR games we consider contain no vertex with value +∞, as they can be removed by this polynomial-time preprocessing.
In those games, one can construct in polynomial time a memoryless strategy, called an attractor strategy, ensuring to reach the target in less than |V | steps from every vertex.
In the following, we assume that all vertices have a value different from +∞. Indeed as described above one can detect in polynomial time the vertices with value +∞ and remove them without changing the values of the other vertices.
Finding vertices with value −∞
To prove the second item, we notice that vertices with value −∞ are exactly those with a value <0 in the mean-payoff game played on the same graph. On the other hand, we can show that every mean-payoff game can be transformed (in polynomial time) into an MCR game such that a vertex has value <0 in the mean-payoff game if and only if the value of its corresponding vertex in the MCR game is −∞. More precisely: 
Proposition 4 1. For all MCR games
Proof To prove the first item, consider an MCR game G = V, E, ω, T -MCR such that Val G (v) = +∞ for all v ∈ V , and G = V, E, ω, MP the same weighted graph equipped with a mean-payoff objective. If Val G (v) < 0, we know that there is a profile of optimal memoryless strategies (σ Max , σ Min ) such that the outcome starting in v and following this profile necessarily starts with a finite prefix and then loops in a cycle with a total weight <0. For every M > 0, we construct a strategy σ M Min that ensures in G a cost less than or equal to −M: this will prove that Val G (v) = −∞. Since we have assumed that Val G (v) = +∞ for all v, we know that Min has a strategy to reach the target from all v (for instance, take the attractor strategy described above), by a path of length at most |V |. Thus, there exists a bound w and a strategy allowing Min to reach the target from every vertex of G with a cost at most w. The strategy σ M Min of Min is then to follow σ Min until the accumulated cost is less than −M − w, at which point it follows his strategy to reach the target. Clearly, for all M, σ M Min guarantees that Min reaches the target with a cost at most −M.
Reciprocally 0. Consider the branch of the previous tree where Max follows strategy σ Max . Since this finite branch has cost less than −M = −|V |W < 0 (W is positive, otherwise the mean-payoff value would be 0), we know for sure that there are two occurrences of the same vertex v with an in-between weight <0: otherwise, by removing all non-negative cycles, we obtain a play without repetition of vertices, henceforth of length bounded by |V |, and therefore of cost at least −M. Suppose that v ∈ V Max . Then, Min has a strategy σ Min to ensure a negative mean-payoff Val G (v, σ Min ) < 0: indeed, he simply modifies 5 his strategy so that he always stays in the negative cycle starting in v (he can do that since σ Max plays a memoryless strategy, so that he can not change his decisions in the cycle), ensuring that, against the optimal strategy σ Max of Max, he gets a mean-payoff being the cost of the cycle. This is a contradiction since Max is supposed to have a strategy ensuring a non-negative mean-payoff from v. Hence, v ∈ V Min . But the same contradiction appears in that case since Min can force that it always stays in the negative cycle by modifying his strategy. Finally, we have proved that Max can not have a memoryless strategy securing a non-negative meanpayoff from v. By memoryless determinacy of the mean-payoff games, this ensures that Min has a memoryless strategy securing a negative mean-payoff from v.
Hence, we have shown that Val G (v) = −∞ if and only if Val G (v) < 0, which concludes the first claim of Proposition 4.
To prove the second item, we reduce mean-payoff games to MCR games as follows. Let G = V, E, ω, MP be a mean-payoff game. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that the graph of the game is bipartite, in the sense that E ⊆ V Max × V Min ∪ V Min × V Max . 6 The problem we are interested in is to decide whether Val G (v) < 0 for a given vertex v. We now construct an MCR game G = V , E , ω , T -MCR from G. The only difference is the presence of a fresh target vertex t on top of vertices of V : V = V {t} with T = {t}.
In G , all values are different from +∞, since Min plays at least every two steps, and has the capability to go to the target vertex with weight 0. Hence, letting G = V , E , ω , MP the mean-payoff game on the weighted graph of G , by the previous direction, we have that
To conclude, we prove that for all vertices
Val G (v) < 0, since Max has no possibility to go by himself to the target. Reciprocally, if Val G (v) < 0, we can project a profile of memoryless optimal strategies over vertices of G, since the target can not be visited in this case (otherwise the optimal play would have mean-payoff 0): the play obtained from v in G is then the projection of the play obtained from v in G , with the same cost. Hence,
Computing all values
Now that we have discussed the case of vertices with value in {−∞, +∞}, let us present our core contribution on MCR games, which is a pseudo-polynomial time, value iteration algorithm to compute the values of those games. Note that this algorithm is correct even when some vertices have value in {−∞, +∞}, as we will argue later.
In all that follows, we assume that there is exactly one target vertex denoted by t, and the only outgoing edge from t is a self loop with weight 0: this is reflected by denoting MCR the payoff mapping {t}-MCR. This is without loss of generality since everything that happens after the first occurrence of a target vertex in a play does not matter for the payoff.
Our value iteration algorithm for MCR games is given in Algorithm 1. As it can be seen, this algorithm consists in computing a sequence of vectors X. Initially (line 2), X(v) = +∞ for all vertices but the target t where X(t) = 0. Then, a new value of X is obtained by optimising locally the value of each node, and changing to −∞ the value X(v) of all vertices v such that the computed value X(v) has gone below a given threshold −(|V |−1)W (line 14). The following proposition states the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1:
Value iteration for MCR games. Gray lines correspond to the computation of optimal strategy for both players (see Sect. 3.4)
Proposition 5 If an MCR game G = V, E, ω, MCR is given as input (possibly with values +∞ or
To establish this proposition, we consider the sequence of values (x i ) i 0 that vector X takes along the execution of the algorithm. More formally, we can define this sequence thanks to the operator F , which denotes the function
Then, for all vertices v we let x 0 (t) = 0, and
The intuition behind this sequence is that x i is the value of the game if we impose that Min must reach the target within i steps (and get a payoff of +∞ if he fails to do so). Notice that operator F is monotonic (i.e. F (x) F (y) for all x y), and that x 1 = F (x 0 ) x 0 , so that we know that the sequence (x i ) i 0 is non-increasing:
In order to formalise the intuition that x i is the value of the game if we impose that Min must reach the target within i steps, we define, for a play
We further let
) (where σ Max and σ Min are respectively strategies of Max and Min). Observe first that for all v ∈ V , for all i 0, and for all strategies σ Max and σ Min :
Indeed, if the target vertex t is reached within i steps, then payoffs are equal. Otherwise,
Thus, for all i 1 and v ∈ V :
which can be rewritten as
Let us now consider the sequence (Val i ) i 0 . We first give an alternative definition of this sequence permitting to show its convergence.
Lemma 6 For all i 1, for all v ∈ V :
Proof The lemma can be established by showing that Val i (v) is the value in a game played on a finite tree of depth i (i.e. by applying a backward induction). We adopt the following notation for labeled unordered trees. A leaf is denoted by (v), where v ∈ V is the label of the leaf. A tree with root labeled by v and subtrees
Then, for each v ∈ V and i 0, we define A i (v) as follows:
Now, let us further label those trees by a value in Z ∪ {+∞} thanks to the function λ (thereby formalising the backward induction). For all trees of the form A 0 (v) = (v), we let:
For all trees of the form
Clearly, for all v ∈ V , for all i 0, the branches of A i (v) correspond to all the possible finite plays Play(v, σ Max , σ Min ) [i] , i.e. there is a branch for each possible strategy profile
for all i 0, which permits us to conclude from (2).
We have just shown that for all i 1,
, and since x 0 = Val 0 , we obtain (as expected) x i = Val i for all i 0. The main question is now to characterise the limit of the sequence (x i ) i 0 , and more precisely, to prove that it is the value Val of the game. Indeed, at this point, it would not be too difficult to show that Val is a fixed point of operator F , but it would be more difficult to show that it is the greatest fixed point of F , that is indeed the limit of sequence (x i ) i 0 (by Kleene's theorem, applicable since F is Scott-continuous).
Instead, we study refined properties of the sequence (Val i ) i 0 , namely its stationarity and the speed of its convergence, and deduce that Val is the greatest fixed point as a corollary (see Corollary 11) . We start by characterising how Val i evolves over the first |V | + 1 steps. The next lemma states that, for each node v, the sequence Val
is of the form
where k is the step at which v has been added to the attractor, and each value a i is finite and bounded:
Lemma 7 Let v ∈ V be a vertex and let
Proof We prove the property for all vertices v, by induction on j. Base case: j = 0. We consider two cases. Either v = t. In this case, k = 0, and we must show that Val Inductive case: j = 1. Let us assume that the lemma holds for all v, for all values of j up to − 1, and let us show that it holds for all v, and for j = . Let us fix a vertex v, and its associated index k such that v ∈ Attr k ({t})\Attr k−1 ({t}). We consider two cases.
1. First, assume k > . In this case, we must show that Val (v) = +∞. We consider again two cases: 
2. Second, assume k . In this case, we must show that Val (v) W . As in the previous item, we consider two cases:
(a) In the case where v ∈ V Min , we let v be a vertex such that v ∈ Attr k−1 ({t}) and (v, v) ∈ E. Such a vertex exists by definition of the attractor. By induction hypothesis, 
In particular, this allows us to conclude that, after |V | steps, all values are bounded by |V |W : This reasoning permits to prove that at every step i,
for all vertices v. Recall from Corollary 8 that, after |V | steps in the sequence, all vertices are assigned a value smaller that |V |W . Moreover, we know that the sequence is non-increasing [see (1)]. In summary, for all k 0 and for all vertices v: We are now ready to prove that this value is the actual value of the game: 
Let us build a tree A σ Min unfolding all possible plays from v against σ Min . A σ Min has a root labeled by v. If a tree node is labeled by a vertex v of Min, this tree node has a unique child labeled by σ Min (v). If a tree node is labeled by a vertex v of Max, this tree node has one child per successor v of v in the graph, labeled by v . We proceed this way until we encounter a node labeled by a vertex from t in which case this node is a leaf. A σ Min is necessarily finite. Otherwise, by König's lemma, it has one infinite branch that never reaches t. From that infinite branch, one can extract a strategy σ Max for Max such that MCR(Play(v, σ Max , σ Min )) = +∞, hence Val(v) = +∞, which contradicts the hypothesis. Assume the tree has depth m. Then, A σ Min is a subtree of the tree A obtained by unfolding all possible plays up to length m (as in the proof of Lemma 6) . In this case, it is easy to check that the value labeling the root of A σ Min after applying backward induction is larger than or equal to the value labeling the root of A after applying backward induction. We are finally able to establish the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let us first suppose that the values of all vertices are finite. Then, x j = Val j is the value of X at the beginning of the jth step of the loop, and the condition of line 13 can never be fulfilled. Hence, by Lemma 9, after at most (2|V | − 1)W |V | + |V | iterations, all values are computed correctly (by Lemma 10) in that case. Suppose now that there are vertices with value +∞. Those vertices will remain at their initial value +∞ during the whole computation, and hence do not interfere with the rest of the computation.
Finally, consider that the game contains vertices with value −∞. By the proof of Lemma 9, we know that optimal values of vertices of values different from −∞ are at least −(|V | − 1)W + 1 so that, if the value of a vertex reaches an integer below −(|V | − 1)W , we are sure that its value is indeed −∞, which proves correct the line 13 of the algorithm. This update may cost at most one step per vertex, which in total adds at most |V | iterations. Moreover, dropping the value to −∞ does not harm the correction for the other vertices (it may only speed up the convergence of their values). This is due to the fact that, if the Kleene sequence (F i (x 0 )) i 0 is initiated with a vector of values x 0 that is greater or equal to the optimal value vector Val, then the sequence converges at least as fast as before towards the optimal value vector.
Example 12
We close this discussion on the computation of the values by an example of execution of Algorithm 1. Consider the MCR game in Fig. 2 . The successive values for vertices (v 1 , v 2 ) (value of the target v 3 is always 0) computed by the value iteration algorithm are the following:
. This requires 2W steps to converge (hence a pseudo-polynomial time).
Computing optimal strategies for both players
As we have seen earlier, Min does not always have optimal memoryless strategies. However, we will see that one can always construct so-called negative cycle strategies (NC-strategies), which are memoryless strategies that have a meaningful structure for Min, in the sense that they allow him either: (i) to reach the target by means of a play whose value is lower that the value of the game; or (ii) to decrease arbitrarily the partial sums along the play, when it does not reach the target (in other words, the partial sums tend to −∞ as the play goes on). So, NC-strategies are, in general, not optimal, as they do not guarantee to reach the target (but in this case, they guarantee that Min will play consistently with his objective, by decreasing the value of the play prefixes).
Formally, an NC-strategy is a memoryless strategy σ Min for player Min such that, for all
We define the fake value, fake(v, σ Min ), of an NC-strategy σ Min as the supremum of the costs of the finite plays that conform with it and start in v:
Notice that the fake value is not necessarily equal to the value of σ Min , since, in the definition of the fake value, we only consider plays that do reach the target, and ignore those that don't (in the computation of the actual value of σ Min , these plays would yield +∞). However, a strategy's fake value is always smaller than or equal to its value. We say that an NC-strategy is fake-optimal if its fake value is smaller than or equal to the optimal value of the game from all vertices. In particular, if the optimal value of a vertex v is −∞, the set
with the biggest cost possible. Since we know that the actual optimal value is −W , the strategy σ Min is fake-optimal.
The following proposition reveals the interest of NC-strategies, by explaining how one can, in some cases, construct an optimal finite-memory strategy from a fake-optimal NC-strategy.
Proposition 14 If Min has a strategy σ †
Min to reach a target vertex (from every possible initial vertex), and has a fake-optimal NC-strategy σ Min , then for all n ∈ Z one can construct a finitememory strategy σ n Min such that for all vertices v, it holds that Val(v, σ n Min ) max(n, Val(v)).
Remark 15
In particular, if the value of all vertices is finite, then one can construct an optimal finite-memory strategy. If the value of a vertex is −∞, this proposition also says that there is an infinite family a strategies that allows one to secure a value which is arbitrarily low (remember that, by definition, −∞ can not be the value that corresponds to a single strategy).
Proof First let us show that for all partial plays π = v 1 . . . v of size at least k|V |+1 (for some k) that conforms with σ Min , TP(π) W (|V | − 1) − k. We establish this proof by induction on k. For the base case, we consider the case where |V |. Then, the play visits at most |V |−1 edges, and thus its total cost is at most W (|V |−1). Now, for the induction, we assume that k|V | + 1 for some k 1. Then, let i and j be two indices such that i < j, v i = v j and j i + |V | (those indices necessarily exist since |V | + 1). Since σ Min is an NCstrategy, the total cost of v i . . . v j is at most −1.
In the following, let σ † Min be a memoryless strategy ensuring to reach the target (obtained by the attractor technique for instance), and let k = max(2W (|V | − 1) − n, 0). The strategy σ n Min consists in playing σ Min , until switching to σ † Min when the length of the play is greater than k|V | + 1: formally σ n
It is clear that this strategy can be implemented by a finite deterministic Moore machine, storing the size of the current play until it is greater than k|V | + 1.
Let us now check that Val(v, σ n Min ) max(n, Val(v)) for all vertices. Let π be a play conforming to σ n Min starting in a vertex v and reaching t. If |π| k|V | + 1 then π is a play that reaches the target conforming to σ Min and therefore
MCR(π) fake v, σ Min
π is a finite play reaching t
Val(v)
σ Min is fake-optimal max(n, Val(v)).
If |π| > k|V | + 1, then let π 1 be its prefix of size k|V | + 1, and π 2 be the rest of the play (π = π 1 · π 2 ). As π 2 is a play that conforms with σ † Min , a memoryless strategy ensuring to reach the target, we know that it reaches the target in at most |V | steps. Therefore, TP(π 2 ) W (|V | − 1). As π 1 is a play that conforms with σ Min of size k|V | + 1, from the reasoning above, TP(π 1 
In practice, rather than using a Moore machine, we can simulate the strategy σ n Min (of the proof above) quite easily: one just has to handle two memoryless strategies and a counter keeping track of the length of the current play. Since σ † Min can easily be obtained by the classical attractor algorithm, we turn our attention to the construction of a fake-optimal NCstrategy σ Min . Without loss of generality, we suppose that no vertex has optimal value +∞, since for these vertices, all strategies are equivalent.
For vertices of value −∞, we can obtain σ Min as an optimal strategy for Min in the meanpayoff game of the first item in Proposition 4. Since the mean-payoff value is negative, this strategy guarantees that it does not reach target, thus generating a fake value −∞, equal to the optimal value of the vertex. Moreover, since it is a memoryless strategy, we know that, as soon as Max plays a memoryless strategy that necessarily reaches a cycle, this cycle must have a negative weight (at most the optimal value of the initial vertex): this strategy is thus a fake-optimal NC-strategy.
From now on, we thus concentrate our study on the vertices of finite value, thus considering that no vertices have value +∞ or −∞ in the MCR game. Let X i denote the value of variable X after i iterations of the loop of Algorithm 1, and let X 0 (v) = +∞ for all v ∈ V . We have seen that the sequence X 0 X 1 X 2 . . . is stationary at some point, equal to Val. Let us now define σ Min (v) for all vertices v ∈ V Min \{t}. We let i v > 0 be the smallest index such that Let us prove that this construction indeed yields a fake-optimal NC strategy σ Min . We first prove the following lemma, that states that the vertex σ Min (v) has already reached its final value at step i v − 1 of the algorithm, for all vertices v.
Lemma 16 For all vertices
Since (X i (v )) i 0 is non-increasing and converges towards the value of v , we know that
which raises a contradiction.
We can now prove that our definition of σ Min has the announced properties: We prove by induction over i < j that
The base case = i + 1 comes from the fact that, since
For the inductive case, let us consider i < < j such that (3) holds and let us prove it for
If v ∈ V Min , by maximality of i v i , we have
using that the sequence X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . is non-increasing. In all cases, we have
Using again that X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . is non-increasing, we obtain
Injecting this into the induction hypothesis, we have
which concludes the proof by induction. In particular, for = j, as v i = v j we obtain that
and as, by definition of 
, and by Lemma 16,
, which proves the inequality for i.
the last equality coming from Corollary 11.
As a corollary, we obtain the existence of finite memory strategies (obtained from σ Min and σ † Min as described above) when all values are finite:
Corollary 18 When the values of all vertices of an MCR game are finite, one can construct an optimal finite-memory strategy for player Min.

Strategies of Max Let us now show that Max always has a memoryless optimal strategy.
This asymmetry stems directly from the asymmetric definition of the game-while Min has the double objective of reaching t and minimising its cost, Max aims at avoiding t, and if not possible, maximising the cost.
Proposition 19 In all MCR games, Max has a memoryless optimal strategy.
Proof For vertices with value +∞, we already know a memoryless optimal strategy for Max, namely every strategy that remains outside the attractor of the target vertices. For vertices with value −∞, all strategies are equally bad for Max.
We now explain how to define a memoryless optimal strategy σ Max for Max in case of a graph containing only finite values. For every finite play π ending in a vertex v ∈ V Max of Max, we let
This is clearly a memoryless strategy. Let us prove that it is optimal for Max, that is, for every vertex v ∈ V , and every strategy σ Min of Min Otherwise, let us prove by induction on 0 i that This will permit to conclude since
The base case i = 0 corresponds to the previous case where the starting vertex is t. Supposing that the property holds for index i, let us prove it for i + 1. We have
v ).
By induction hypothesis, we have
We now consider two cases:
, so that by definition of σ Max :
Using Corollary 11 and (4), we obtain
Once again using Corollary 11 and (4), we obtain
This concludes the proof.
Notice that strategy σ Max can be computed directly, along the execution of the value iteration algorithm. This corresponds to line 7 of Algorithm 1.
Notice further that the presence of the if condition in line 11, and the absence of a similar condition at line 7, are crucial. Indeed, removing the if from line 11 would amount to computing σ Min from the vector of values obtained at the end of the value iteration, when the vector X has stabilised. Let us show that, in this case, the algorithm might fail to compute a fake-optimal NC-strategy, by considering the MCR game in the left part of Fig. 3 Fig. 3 to explain why line 7 is not under the range of an if(X(v) = X pr e (v)) condition. After two iterations, X reaches the optimal values (−1, 0, −1, 0) but a Max strategy σ Max such that σ Max (v 1 ) = v 3 can still be chosen since X pr e (v 3 ) = 0 at that point. However, on the next iteration, X(v 3 ) = X pr e (v 3 ) = −1 (indeed, X has now stabilised on all nodes), and it is crucial that σ Max (v 1 ) = v 2 gets computed, otherwise the strategy would not be optimal for Max.
An efficient algorithm to solve total-payoff games
We now turn our attention back to total-payoff games (without reachability objective), and discuss our main contribution. Building on the results of the previous section, we introduce the first (as far as we know) pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for solving those games in the presence of arbitrary weights, thanks to a reduction from total-payoff games to MCR games. The MCR game produced by the reduction has size pseudo-polynomial in the size of the original total-payoff game. Then, we show how to compute the values of the total-payoff game without building the entire MCR game, and explain how to deduce memoryless optimal strategies from the computation of our algorithm.
Reduction to MCR games
We provide a transformation from a total-payoff game G = V, E, ω, TP to an MCR game G K (where K is a parameter in N) such that the values of G can be extracted from the values in G K (as formalised below). Intuitively, G K simulates the game where players play in G; Min may propose to stop playing and reach a fresh vertex t acting as the target; Max can then accept, in which case we reach the target, or refuse at most K times, in which case the game continues. Structurally, G K consists of a sequence of copies of G along with some new states that we now describe formally. We let t be a fresh vertex, and, for all n 1, we define the MCR game G n = V n , E n , ω n , {t}-MCR where V n Max (respectively, V n Min ) consists of n copies (v, j), with 1 j n, of each vertex v ∈ V Max (respectively, v ∈ V Min ) and some exterior vertices (ex, v, j) for all v ∈ V and 1 j n [respectively, interior vertices (in, v, j) for all v ∈ V and 1 j n]. Moreover, V n Max contains the fresh target vertex t. Edges are given by
All edge weights are zero, except edges ((v, j), (in, v , j)) that have weight ω(v, v ).
Example 20 For example, considering the weighted graph of Fig. 2 , the corresponding reachability total-payoff game G 3 is depicted in Fig. 4 (where weights 0 have been removed).
The next proposition formalises the relationship between the two games, and is proved in the rest of this subsection. Fig. 4 MCR game G 3 associated with the total-payoff game of Fig. 2 The bound K will be found by using the fact (informally described in the previous section) that if not infinite, the value of a MCR game belongs in [−(|V | − 1) × W + 1, |V | × W ], and that after enough visits of the same vertex, an adequate loop ensures that G k verifies the above properties.
Proposition 21 Let K = |V |(2(|V | − 1)W + 1). For all v ∈ V and k K , -Val G (v) = +∞ if and only if Val
To prove Proposition 21, we must relate paths in games G and G n : with each finite path in G n , we associate a finite path in G, obtained by looking at the sequence of vertices of V appearing inside the vertices of the finite play. Formally, the projection of a finite path π is the sequence proj(π) of vertices of G inductively defined by proj(ε) = ε and for all finite path π, v ∈ V and 1 j n:
In particular, notice that in the case of a play with prefix (ex, v, j)t, the rest of the play is entirely composed of target vertices t, since t is a sink state. For instance, the projection of the finite play
of the game G 3 of Fig. 4 is given by
The following lemma relates plays of G n with their projection in G, comparing their total-payoff.
Lemma 22
The projection mapping satisfies the following properties.
If π is a finite play in G n then proj(π) is a finite play in G.
If π is a play in G n that does not reach the target, then proj(π) is a play in G.
For all finite play π, TP(π) = TP(proj(π)).
Proof The proof of 2 is a direct consequence of 1. With each vertex w ∈ V n \{t}, we naturally associate a vertex f (w) as follows:
Then notice that if (w, w ) ∈ E n with w, w = t, then either f (w) = f (w ) or ( f (w), f (w )) ∈ E. We now prove 1 and 3 inductively on the size of the finite play π = w 1 . . . w k of G n , along with the fact that If k = 0, then π = proj(π) = ε are finite plays with the same total-payoff. If k = 1, either proj(π) = ε or π = (v, j) and proj(π) = v: in both cases, the properties hold trivially. Otherwise, k 2 and we distinguish several possible prefixes:
-If π = (in, v, j)π , then proj(π) = proj(π ). Hence, 1 holds by induction hypothesis.
If proj(π) is non-empty, so is proj(π ). Moreover, the first vertex of π is either (v, j) or (ex, v, j), so that we have 4 by induction hypothesis. Finally, the previous remark shows that the first edge of π has necessarily weight 0, so that, TP(π) = TP(π ), and 3 also holds by induction hypothesis. -If π = (v, j) π , then proj(π) = v proj(π ) so that 4 holds directly. Moreover, π is a non-empty finite play so that π = (in, v , j)π with (v, v ) ∈ E, and proj(π ) = proj(π ). By induction, proj(π ) is a finite play in G, and it starts with v (by 4). Since (v, v ) ∈ E, this shows that proj(π) is a finite play. Moreover,
v )+TP(π ). By induction hypothesis, we have TP(π ) = MCR(proj(π )). Moreover, MCR(proj(π)) = ω(v, v ) + MCR(proj(π ))
which concludes the proof of 3.
this allows us to conclude directly by using the previous case. -Otherwise, π = (ex, v, j)tπ , and then proj(π) = v is a finite play with total-payoff 0, like π, and 4 holds trivially.
The next lemma states that when playing memoryless strategies, one can bound the totalpayoff of all finite plays. 
Lemma 23 Let v ∈ V , and σ
. . v k is a finite play starting from v that conforms to σ Min , and by induction hypothesis TP(v 1 We now compare values in both games. A first lemma shows, in particular, that
Lemma 25 For all m ∈ Z, v ∈ V , and n
Proof By hypothesis and using the memoryless determinacy of total-payoff games [12] , there exists a memoryless strategy σ Min 
Min be the strategy in G n defined, for all finite play π, vertex v and 1 j n, by
Intuitively σ m Min simulates σ Min , and asks to leave the copy when the current total-payoff is less than or equal to m. Notice that, by construction of σ m Min , proj(π) conforms to σ Min , if π conforms to σ m Min . As a first step, if a play π starting in (v, n) and conforming to σ m Min encounters the target then its value is at most m. Indeed, it is of the form π = π (in, v , j)(ex, v , j)t ω , and since it conforms to σ m Min we have
Then, assume, by contradiction, that there exists a play π starting in (v, n) and conforming to σ m Min , that does not encounter the target. Then, this means that Min does not ask n + 1 times the ability to exit in π [since on the (n + 1)th time that we jump in an exterior vertex, Max is forced to go to the target]. In particular, there exists 0 j n such that π is of the form , v i , j) ) m + 1. Therefore, since every prefix of proj(π) is the projection of a prefix of π, Lemma 22 shows that TP(proj(π)) m + 1 > m, which raises a contradiction since proj(π) conforms to σ Min and Val(v, σ Min ) m. Hence every play that conforms to σ m Min encounters the target, and, hence, has value at most m. This implies that
We now turn to the other comparison between Val
can be infinite in case the target is not reachable, we have to be more careful. In particular, we show that
holds for large values of n. In the following, we let K = |V |(2(|V | − 1)W + 1).
Lemma 26 For all m
Proof By hypothesis and using the memoryless determinacy proved by Gimbert and Zielonka [12] , there exists a memoryless strategy σ Max for Max in G such that
Max be the strategy in G K defined, for all finite play π, vertex v and 1 j n, by:
Intuitively σ m Max simulates σ Max , and accepts to go to the target when the current totalpayoff is greater than or equal to m.
By construction of σ m
Max , if π conforms to σ m Max , then proj(π) conforms to σ Max . From the structure of the weighted graph, we know that for every play π of G k , there exists 1 j k such that π is of the form
there are no occurrences of exterior vertices in π k , . . . , π j , π ; for all j, all vertices in π belong to the th copy of G; either π = t ω or all vertices of π belong to the ( j + 1)th copy of G (in which case, j < k) .
We now show that, in G k , MCR(π) m for all play π starting in (v, k) and conforming to σ m Max . There are three cases to consider. 1. If π does not reach the target, then MCR(π) = +∞ m.
Thus, using Lemma 22, 
Since π conforms to σ m Max and according to the assumption, we have that for all i,
We consider two cases.
conforms to σ Max . Furthermore, using again Lemma 22,
and since TP(u 1 . . . u ) = TP(π i ) 0, we have
Thus π is a play starting from v that conforms to σ Max but whose total-payoff is strictly less than m, which raises a contradiction.
which contradicts the assumption that
We have shown that MCR(π) m for all play π starting in (v, k) and conforming to σ m Max , which implies
Using the two last lemmas, we can now prove Proposition 21 by relating precisely values in G and G k .
Proof of Proposition 21
Let v ∈ V be a vertex. We consider three cases:
by Lemmas 25 and 26, m Val
G K (v, K ) m. Therefore Val G K (v, K ) = m. -If Val G (v) = +∞, then Val G (v) (|V | − 1)W + 1. By Lemma 26, Val G K (v, K ) (|V | − 1)W + 1.
Value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games
By Proposition 21, an immediate way to obtain a value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games is to build game G K , run Algorithm 1 on it, and map the computed values back to G. We take advantage of the structure of G K to provide a better algorithm that avoids building G K . Intuitively, we first compute the values of the vertices in the last copy of the game (vertices of the form (v, 1), (in, v, 1) and (ex, v, 1) ), then of those in the penultimate (vertices of the form (v, 2), (in, v, 2) and (ex, v, 2)), and so on.
We first sketch the intuitions that lead to the formalisation of these ideas. Let Z j be a vector mapping each vertex v of G to the value
. Thus, assuming that we have computed the values of all vertices in the jth copy, H returns the value of the vertices in the j + 1st copy. In other words, the definition of H(Y ) for some vector Y is to extract from G K one copy of the game (that we call G Y ), and make Y appear in the weights of some edges as illustrated in Fig. 5 . This game, G Y , simulates a play in G in which Min can opt for 'leaving the game' at each round (by moving to the target), obtaining max(0, Y (v)), if v is the current vertex. Then, we can define H(Y )(v) as the value of v in G Y . By construction, it is easy to see that Z j+1 = H(Z j ) holds for all j 1, i.e. that H indeed corresponds to computing the values of the vertices in the j + 1st copy, given the values in the jth copy. Furthermore, letting Z 0 (v) = −∞ for all v, and Z 1 = H(Z 0 ), we will prove that: (i) H is monotonic, but may not be Scott-continuous; (ii) the sequence (Z j ) j 0 converges towards Val G . These arguments are the main ideas justifying Algorithm 2 to solve total-payoff games. Intuitively, the outer loop computes, in variable Y, a non-decreasing sequence of vectors whose limit is Val G , and that is stationary (this is not necessarily the case for the sequence (Z j ) j 0 ).
Algorithm 2: A value iteration algorithm for total-payoff games
Input: Total-payoff game G = V, E, ω, TP , W largest weight in absolute value We first define formally the game G Y described informally above. With the original totalpayoff game G = V, E, ω, TP and with every vector Y ∈ Z V ∞ , we associate the MCR game G Y = V , E Y , ω Y , {t}-MCR as follows. The sets of vertices are given by
As in game G j , vertices of the form (in, v) are called interior vertices. Edges are defined by
It is easy to see that lines 3-10 are a rewriting of Algorithm 1 in the special case of game G Y : in particular, neither the target vertex nor interior vertices are explicit, but their behaviour is taken into account by the transformation performed in line 3 and the operators min used in the inner computation of lines 6 and 7. Hence, if we define
it has value H(Y ).
Notice that the game G Y resembles a copy of G in the game G j of the previous section. More, precisely, from the values (Val G j (v, j) ) v∈V in the jth copy, we can deduce the values in the ( j + 1)th copy by an application of operator H:
Although the 0th copy is not defined, we abuse the notation and set Val G 0 (v, 0) = −∞, which still conforms to the above equality. Furthermore, due to the structure of the game 
Proposition 28 H is a monotonic operator.
Proof For every vector Y ∈ Z V ∞ , let F Y be the operator associated with the MCR game as defined in Sect. 3, i.e. for all X ∈ Z V ∞ , and for all
We know from Corollary 11 that Val G Y is the greatest fixed point of
Indeed, to get the result it suffices to notice that for all
[the only differences are on the edges ((in, v), t)].
Consider then the vector X 0 defined by
, then a simple induction shows that for all i,
Notice that H may not be Scott-continuous, as shown in the following example.
Example 29 Recall that, in our setting, a Scott-continuous operator is a mapping F :
∞ such that for every sequence of vectors (x i ) i 0 having a limit x ω , the sequence (F(x i )) i 0 has a limit equal to F(x ω ).
We present a total-payoff game whose associated operator H is not continuous. Let G be the total-payoff game containing one vertex v of Min and a self loop of weight −1 (as Fig. 6 ). For all Y ∈ Z, in the MCR game G Y , v has value −∞, indeed one can take the loop an arbitrary number of times before reaching the target, ensuring a value arbitrary low. Therefore, if we take an increasing sequence 
Proof To ease the notations, we denote Val G by Y in this proof. To prove this lemma, we just have to show that for all v 1 ∈ V , the value of v 1 in the MCR game G Y is at most its value in the original total-payoff game G, i.e. in, v 2 ) . . . (in, v i )) = TP(v 1 . . . v i ). 
and H is monotonous, we prove by immediate induction that
This implies that Val G Y , showing that Val G is indeed the least pre-fixed point of H, and hence the least fixed point of H, by the above reasoning.
Before continuing the proof of Theorem 27, we show the result used in the previous remark. 
Lemma 33
1 = v, TP(v 1 . . . v k ) m − (|V | − 1)W . (iii) For all m ∈ N and k (m + (|V | − 1)W )|V | + 1, Val G k (v, k) m. (iv) lim j→∞ Val G j (v, j) = +∞.TP(v 1 . . . v k ) = TP(v 1 . . . v i ) + TP(v i . . . v j ) + TP(v j . . . v k ) = TP(v 1 . . . v i v j+1 . . . v k ) + TP(v i . . . v j ) TP(v 1 . . . v i v j+1 . . . v k ) + 1. from (i)(m − 1)|V | + 1 (because i < j |V | + 1, implying that j − i |V |), we have TP(v 1 . . . v i v j+1 . . . v k ) m − 1 − (|V | − 1)W , thus TP(v 1 . . . v k ) m − (|V | − 1)W . To prove (iii), let σ Max be a strategy of Max in G k defined by σ Max (v, j) = (in, σ Max (v), j) and σ Max (ex, v, j) = (v, j − 1)
Item (iv) is then a direct consequence of (iii).
We are now ready to state and prove the inductive invariant allowing us to show the correctness of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 34 Before the jth iteration of the external loop of Algorithm 2, we have
Suppose then that the invariant holds for j 0. We know [see (5) 
Moreover, using again the monotony of H and Lemma 31, we have
A closer look at line 11 shows that H(Y j ) and Y j+1 coincide over vertices v such that
In the overall, we have proved 
We are now able to prove the correctness and termination of the algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 27
For j = K (remember that K was defined in the previous section), the invariant of Lemma 34 becomes
for all vertices v ∈ V . Notice that the iteration may have stopped before iteration K , in which case the sequence (Y j ) j 0 may be considered as stationary. In case
by the operation performed at line 11, we obtain that
is an upper bound on the number of iterations before convergence of Algorithm 2, and moreover, at the convergence, the algorithm outputs the vector of optimal values of the total-payoff game.
Convergence speed of the algorithm Observe that the number of iterations in each internal loop is controlled by Theorem 3. On the example of Fig. 2 , only two external iterations are necessary, but the number of iterations of each internal loop would be 2W. By contrast, for the total-payoff game depicted in Fig. 7 , each internal loop requires two iterations to converge, but the external loop takes W iterations to stabilise. A combination of both examples would experience a pseudo-polynomial number of iterations to converge in both the internal and external loops, matching the W 2 term of the above complexity: this gives rise to the parametric example of Fig. 8. 
Optimal strategies
In Sect. 3, we have shown, for all MCR games, the existence of a fake-optimal NC-strategy permitting to reconstruct an optimal finite-memory strategy for Min (if every vertex has value different from −∞, or a strategy ensuring every possible threshold for vertices with value −∞). Given a total-payoff game G, if we apply this construction to the game G Val G , we obtain an NC-strategy σ Min . Consider the strategy σ Min , obtained by projecting σ Min on V as follows: for all finite plays π and vertices v ∈ V Min , we let σ Min , v ) . We show thereafter that σ Min is optimal for Min in G. Notice that σ Min , and hence σ Min , can be computed during the last iteration of the value iteration algorithm, as explained in the case of MCR games in Sect. 3.4. A similar construction can be done to compute an optimal strategy for Max.
Theorem 35
The memoryless strategy σ Min is optimal in G.
Proof We start by showing that for all v,
We then show that 
Assume first that during π, Min never asks to go to the target, i.e. for all
. . is a play of G Val G that conforms with σ Min . As there are only finitely many vertices in G Val G , there must exist a vertex v that appears infinitely often in this play. As σ Min is an NC-strategy, the accumulated cost of the chunk of the play between two occurrences of v has weight at most −1, thus the total payoff of v 0 (in, v 1 )v 1 (in, v 2 ) . . . is −∞. As the total-payoff of this play is equal to the total payoff of π, we have that TP(π) = −∞. Otherwise, Min asks at some point to go to the target: let i π be the first index such that σ Min (in, v i π ) = t. As the strategy σ Min is a fake-optimal NC-strategy, we know that the accumulated cost of π until the target verifies TP(π) = MCR(π) 
, which proves (2). Now let us prove the theorem. Let v be a vertex in
Otherwise we construct inductively an increasing sequence of indices
. . be the current suffix of π: since TP(π) = −∞, we have TP(π ) = −∞, thus (2) shows that by letting i j+1 = i j + i π , we obtain
We can then show, by a direct induction, that for all j 1,
Implementation and heuristics
In this section, we report on a prototype implementation of our algorithms. 7 For convenience reasons, we have implemented them as an add-on to PRISM-games [7] , although we could have chosen to extend another model-checker as we do not rely on the probabilistic features of PRISM models (i.e. we use the PRISM syntax of stochastic multi-player games, allowing arbitrary rewards, and forbidding probability distributions different of Dirac ones). We then use rPATL specifications of the form C R min / max=? [F ∞ ϕ] and C R min / max=? [F c ⊥] to model respectively MCR games and total-payoff games, where C represents a coalition of players that want to minimise/maximise the payoff, and ϕ is another rPATL formula describing the target set of vertices (for total-payoff games, such a formula is not necessary). We have tested our implementation on toy examples. On the parametric one Fig. 8 , results obtained by applying our algorithm for total-payoff games are summarised in Table 1 , where for each pair (W, n), we give the time t in seconds, the number k e of iterations in the external loop, and the total number k i of iterations in the internal loop.
Notice that due to the very little memory consumption of the algorithm, there is no risk of running out of memory. However, the execution time can become very large. For instance, in case W = 500 and n = 1000, the execution time becomes 536 s whereas the total number of iterations in the internal loop is greater than a million.
Acceleration techniques
We close this section by sketching two techniques that can be used to speed up the computation of the fixed point in Algorithms 1 and 2. We fix a weighted graph V, E, ω . Both accelerations rely on a topological order of the strongly connected components (SCC for short) of the graph, given as a function c : V → N, mapping each vertex to its component, verifying that (i) c(V ) = {0, . . . , p} for some p 0, (ii) c −1 (q) is a maximal SCC for all q, (iii) and c(v) c(v ) for all (v, v ) ∈ E. 8 In case of an MRC game with t the unique target, c −1 (0) = {t}. Intuitively, c induces a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are the sets c −1 (q) for all q ∈ c(V ), and with an edge (S 1 , S 2 ) if and only if there are
The first acceleration heuristic is a divide-and-conquer technique that consists in applying Algorithm 1 (or the inner loop of Algorithm 2) iteratively on each c −1 (q) for q = 0, 1, 2, . . . , p, using at each step the information computed during steps j < q (since the value of a vertex v depends only on the values of the vertices v such that c(v ) c(v)).
The second acceleration heuristic consists in studying more precisely each component c −1 (q). Having already computed the optimal values Val(v) of vertices v ∈ c −1 ({0, . . . , q − 1}), we ask an oracle to precompute a finite set S v ⊆ Z ∞ of possible optimal values for each vertex v ∈ c −1 (q). For MCR games and the inner iteration of the algorithm for total-payoff games, one way to construct such a set S v is to consider that possible optimal values are the one of non-looping paths inside the component exiting it, since, in MCR games, there exist optimal strategies for both players whose outcome is a non-looping path (see Sect. 3).
Algorithms 3 and 4 are enhanced versions of Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively, that apply these acceleration heuristics. Finally, we note that we can identify classes of weighted graphs for which there exists an oracle that runs in polynomial time and returns, for all vertices v, a set S v of polynomial size. On such classes, Algorithms 1 and 2, enhanced with our two acceleration techniques, run in polynomial time. For instance, for all fixed positive integers L, the class of weighted graphs where every component c −1 (q) uses at most L distinct weights (that can be arbitrarily large in absolute value) satisfies this criterion. Table 1 contains the results obtained with the heuristics on the parametric example presented before. Observe that the acceleration technique permits here to decrease drastically the execution time, the number of iterations in both loops depending not even anymore on W . Even though the number of iterations in the external loop increases with heuristics, due to the decomposition, less computation is required in each internal loop since we only apply the computation for the active component.
Conclusion
In this work, we have provided the first (to the best of our knowledge) pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to solve total-payoff games with arbitrary (positive and negative) weights. This algorithm is a variation on the classical value iteration technique. To obtain this algorithm, we have reduced the problem of solving total-payoff games to that of solving MCR games, a variant of the former where the game stops as soon as a target vertex is reached (in which case the payoff of the plays is the total accumulated weight of the play up to the target). We believe that those MCR games are interesting by themselves, as they can be used to model problems where, for instance, a target configuration must be reached while ensuring a minimal energy spending. Notice also that they have been used as a building block for the resolution of priced timed games in [3, 4] . We have characterised the optimal strategies that one can extract in those total-payoff and MCR games. Finally, we have implemented our algorithms and proposed some heuristics that take into account the structure of the games to speed up the computation. As future works, we would like to push further the MCR games in a context of non-zero sum games where each player wants to optimise its accumulated cost until reaching its own target. As a possible direction, the search for Nash equilibria in this context will most likely benefit from our better understanding of optimal strategies for both players in the underlying zero-sum games. This bridge from zero-sum to non-zero-sum games has already been investigated for concurrent priced games by Klimoš et al. [14] , and Brihaye et al. [2] to find simple Nash equilibria for large classes of multiplayer cost games. Indeed, two main differences separate our two definitions. The first one is the treatment of negative weight cycles. Actually, in LSP, the fact that after selecting strategy σ Max a vertex can not reach the target anymore in G σ Max does not prevent from mapping the distance −∞ to a vertex contained in a negative cycle. This is in contrast with our definition, that would benefit to Max since in such a situation, the target is not reachable leading to the value +∞. 9 The second difference consists in the treatment of zero weight cycle. In LSP, a distance zero is then computed, which is highly related with the fact that the authors want to apply the resolution of LSP to mean-payoff games.
Nevertheless, in Section 9 of [1] , the authors briefly study another more natural definition, mapping zero weight cycle to the distance +∞ (closer to our definition). In that case, the LSP distances of vertices v 1 , v 2 and v 3 then match our value vector in min-cost reachability games. Unfortunately, it is not clear how the algorithm that is presented by Björklund and Vorobyov can be adapted to accomodate this new definition of the cost and compute the values of the nodes. Indeed, Proposition 9.1 of [1] proves that the decision version of the LSP (i.e. deciding if the LSP of a vertex is positive or not in a given graph) is in NP ∩ co-NP , and they claim (without formal proof) that their pseudo-polynomial time algorithm permits to decide this problem. This requires a first transformation of the problem, so that no zero weight cycles remain in the weighted graph. This transformation, explained above Proposition 9.1, is correct but does not preserve the LSP of the vertices, so that their algorithm do not compute the LSP distance of vertices, but only study their positivity.
Hence, the comparison between our definition of min-cost reachability and the definition of LSP can be summarised as follows: It is plausible that the pseudo-polynomial time algorithm of Björklund and Vorobyov could be adapted to compute the LSP value according to the second definition. Yet, even in this case, there are several points of comparison worth mentioning:
1. The worst-case complexity of the algorithm proposed by Björklund and Vorobyov is O(|V | 2 |E|W ), which matches ours (see Proposition 5) . Nevertheless, our solution is much easier to describe and to implement: while they must make repeated calls to a modified version of the Bellman-Ford algorithm (the modification is crucial to obtain their complexity), we have a simple fixed point algorithm. 2. Our algorithm exploits the value iteration paradigm (that can be seen as a backward induction), while theirs is a strategy iteration algorithm. Because of that, there are examples on which our algorithm is more efficient that theirs (although the worst-case complexity is the same). As an example, the LSP instance presented in Fig. 2 of [1] , with 2n + 1 vertices but a biggest weight W exponential in n, requires an exponential number 2 n of iterations for the strategy iteration algorithm, but our value iteration algorithm (based on backward induction) would solve it in linear time with respect to n. More precisely, with our tool, we are able to compute the values of this game in less than a millisecond for constant n = 15 (i.e. a game with 32 vertices and largest weight W ≈ 2.68 × 10 8 ): the value of the initial state obtained is 4.74 × 10 9 , and as aforementioned, the number of iterations that our value iteration requires is 16, linear in n. Our tool being an add-on of the PRISM model-checker, relying on the use of integer rewards, we have not been able to build the game for a value n > 15. 3. We propose several acceleration heuristics that perform well on several examples we have tried. These accelerations cannot easily be incorporated in their algorithm (because it is a strategy iteration algorithm). 4. Finally, from the theoretical point of view, Björklund and Vorobyov do not study the strategies of the opponent player Min. In contrast, our study allows us to produce optimal strategies for both players, and in particular, show that memoryless strategies may not be sufficient for Min, whereas they are enough for Max.
